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Available online 19 March 2016The partial awareness hypothesis is a theoretical proposal that recently provided a reconciling solution to graded
and dichotomous accounts of consciousness. It suggests thatwe can become conscious of distinct properties of an
object independently, ranging from low-level features to complex forms of representation. We investigated this
hypothesis using classic visual word masking adapted to a near-threshold paradigm. The masking intensity was
adjusted to the individual perception threshold, at which individual alphabetical letters, but not words, could be
perceived in approximately half of the trials. We conﬁned perception to a pre-lexical stage of word processing
that corresponded to a clear condition of partial awareness. At this level of representation, the stimulus proper-
ties began to emerge within consciousness, yet they did not escalate to full stimulus awareness. In other words,
participants were able to perceive individual letters, while remaining unaware of the whole letter strings pre-
sented. Cortical activity measured with MEG was compared between physically identical trials that differed in
perception (perceived, not perceived). We found that compared to no awareness, partial awareness of words
was characterized by suppression of oscillatory alpha power in left temporal and parietal cortices. The analysis
of functional connectivity with seeds based on the power effect in these two regions revealed sparse connections
for the parietal seed, and strong connections between the temporal seed and other regions of the language
network. We suggest that the engagement of language regions indexed by alpha power suppression is responsi-
ble for establishing and maintaining conscious representations of individual pre-lexical units.
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How conscious perception relates to sensory processing in the
human brain is amajor unanswered question in cognitive neuroscience.
In recent years, various inﬂuential theoretical frameworks have
stimulated a lot of experimental work to identify the neural correlates
of consciousness (NCC; Crick and Koch, 1998). One prominent theory,
the global neuronal workspace (GNW; Baars, 2005; Dehaene et al.,
1998), proposed that a stimulus can be consciously perceived when,
after activating essential nodes in sensory regions, the signal is distrib-
uted globally in the cortex and reverberates among high-level corticalNCC, Neural correlates of
ear-threshold; CoLFIS, Corpus e
light processing; HPI, Head-
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rent sources; MNI, Montreal
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indyRoad, Cardiff, CF244HQ,UK.
i).
ed in this manuscript.
. This is an open access article underareas, including frontal, temporal and parietal regions (Dehaene et al.,
2001; Dehaene and Changeux, 2005; Nakamura et al., 2005). Crucially,
neuronal activity conﬁned to speciﬁc early sensory areas would thus
not sufﬁce for conscious perception.
Interestingly, Kouider et al. (2010) recently suggested that percep-
tion of a stimulus can result in different levels of conscious representa-
tion. According to the partial awareness hypothesis (Kouider et al.,
2010; Kouider and Dupoux, 2004), objects are not necessarily perceived
in an all-or-nonemanner, but ratherwe could be aware of certain object
features while being unaware of others (see also Cleeremans, 2007;
Overgaard et al., 2006; Sergent and Dehaene, 2004, on the debate of
whether consciousness is a graded or dichotomous phenomenon).
Therefore, we could become conscious of different properties of an
object, organized hierarchically from low-level to complex forms of
representation, independently.
To investigate this hypothesis, we developed a paradigm that
exploits the strengths of two different approaches in the tradition of
consciousness research (Dehaene et al., 2006), namely near-threshold
(NT) and visual masking paradigms. The outstanding value of NT para-
digms consists of providing researchers with the opportunity to isolate
the neuronal processes that reﬂect qualitative changes in perception.the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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the individual perceptual threshold, which results in stimuli being con-
sciously perceived in only a proportion of trials. However, as a
consequence of the threshold-level reduction of stimulus intensity, NT
paradigms can hardly preserve the more ﬁne-grained features of com-
plex stimuli. To circumvent this problem, visual masking techniques
have been extensively employed (see Breitmeyer and Ogmen, 2000;
Enns and Di Lollo, 2000; Kouider and Dehaene, 2007 for reviews), par-
ticularly in the study of language processing (see Dehaene et al., 2001
for an example). Conventionally, the strength of the mask interference
is changed to make stimuli either completely visible or completely in-
visible, thereby retaining all or none of their characteristics into
consciousness.
We designed a word masking paradigm in which the mask's
strength was adjusted to a constant threshold level, similar to the NT
approach. In agreement with the partial awareness hypothesis, we
deﬁned our threshold as the chance-level probability of detecting letters
in masked word presentations. Hence, we prevented participants from
perceiving the entire word, and expected them to report seeing letters
in only a proportion of trials. Our manipulation provided us with an
ideal scenario to study the neural basis of a clearly characterized condi-
tion of partial awareness.
Speciﬁcally, the perception of letters marks the transition between
two distinct levels of stimulus representation. On the one hand, letters
become consciously visible by virtue of combining basic geometrical
shapes intomeaningful patterns. On the other hand, neuronal activation
in response to letter patterns is not yet sufﬁcient to trigger full stimulus
awareness, and perception does not escalate to accessing the lexical and
semantic properties of the word. In line with the GNWmodel outlined
above, we predicted that partial awareness of words would be reﬂected
by the engagement of core language-processing regions, also referred to
as essential nodes (Zeki and Bartels, 1999; see Tong et al., 1998 for an
example). To investigate this, we compared neuronal oscillatory activi-
ty, measured with MEG, between perceived and not perceived stimuli.
We hypothesized that differences in oscillatory power would be found
in cortical regions of the left hemisphere that represent the stimulus
features disentangled by our experimental manipulation. Based on the
anatomical locations showing the greatest power effects, we then
used a seeded functional connectivity analysis approach to explore the
functional interactions between nodes of the language network.
Materials and methods
Participants
Twenty right-handed healthy volunteers (mean age ± standard
deviation: 25 ± 5.2; ten females) took part in the study after giving in-
formed consent. Following behavioral data analysis, three participants
were excluded due to inadequate task performance (two of them
because of unbalanced proportion of perceived and not perceived stim-
uli, and one of them because of too many false alarms, see Behavioral
data analysis below). Therefore, the analysis of MEG data was
performed on seventeen out of the initial twenty participants. All partic-
ipants were native Italian speakers and, to prevent confounding effects
in the lexical decision task, were required to have no to very poor
knowledge of the Spanish language. All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and reported no known history of neurolog-
ical or psychiatric disorders. The experimental procedure was approved
by the local ethics committee and participants received monetary
reimbursement for their participation.
Stimuli and procedure
The experiment consisted of the adaptation of a visual masking
paradigm, in which masked linguistic stimuli were presented at the
individual threshold for the detection of letters, pre-estimated withtwo independent one-up one-down staircases converging to 50% detec-
tion rate. The visibility of the letters was manipulated by adjusting the
luminance contrast of the masks. Prior to beginning the main experi-
ment, participants completed 20 training trials that served to test if
the contrast threshold had been estimated successfully. Two different
sets of stimuli (each including both words and pseudowords) were
used for the threshold and training procedures, none of whichwas pre-
sented in the main experiment. In the main experiment, participants
had to perform two sequential tasks. Firstly, they had to report whether
they were able to identify at least one letter in the stimulus presenta-
tion. This constituted the perceptual decision, or detection task. Second-
ly, they were required to perform a lexical decision and classify the
stimulus as word or pseudoword. Participants were instructed to also
respond when the stimulus was not perceived, i.e. irrespectively of
whether they had perceived letters or not. The total time of the experi-
mental session, including preparation, was less than 2 h.
The trial structure of the experiment is illustrated in Fig. 1. Target
stimuli were presented with three different intensities (320 trials at
threshold, 40 supra-threshold catch trials and 40 empty trials), in ran-
dom order and equally distributed across eight blocks (~5 min each).
Participants were allowed to take breaks between blocks. Target stimuli
consisted of strings of four letters forming either a word or a
pseudoword (two stimulus classes, see Stimuli and procedure below).
In threshold trials, letters were presented in medium-contrast gray. In
catch trials, letters were presented in white to increase their visibility.
In empty trials, letterswere presented in black andwere therefore invis-
ible. Each trial beganwith awhite ﬁxation cross (0.8 × 0.7° visual angle)
presented centrally on a black background for a jittered period of 3 to
6 s, with shorter intervals being more common than longer ones. The
target stimulus was presented centrally (3 × 1° visual angle) for
33 ms, and was immediately preceded and followed by a forward and
a backward mask of 67 ms duration each. Masks consisted of a ﬁxed
number of different shapes (squares, diamonds, triangles and circles)
drawnwith the same line thickness as the text font (Arial) and covering
the same approximate area. The size and position of the shapes was
pseudo-randomly generated on a trial-by-trial basis, but with forward
and backward masks of the same trial remaining identical. The ﬁxation
cross disappeared at forward mask onset and reappeared at backward
mask offset. After a 500 ms interval, two questions were displayed
consecutively on the screen for up to 2 s each, or until a response was
given. Participants responded ‘perceived’ or ‘not perceived’ to detection
and ‘word’ or ‘pseudoword’ to classiﬁcation by raising the index ormid-
dle ﬁnger of their right hand. The responses associated with the index
and the middle ﬁnger were counterbalanced in all possible combina-
tions, both across participants and between the ﬁrst and second
response.
The two classes of target stimuli consisted of words and
pseudowords, equally distributed across levels of stimulus intensity
(threshold, catch, and empty trials) and experimental blocks. Words
were selected from the CoLFIS database (Bertinetto et al., 2005) and
consisted of Italian disyllabic nouns only, syllables having consonant–
vowel structure. Pseudowords were created by substituting the second
consonant of eachword stimulus, following the phonotactic restrictions
of the Italian language. Pseudowords that were English words and
pseudowords that would become Italian words by adding an accent to
the ﬁnal vowel were excluded. Words and pseudowords did not differ
statistically in bigram frequency (t(398) = 1.28, p= 0.2) and neighbor-
hood size (t(398) = 1.02, p= 0.3).
All stimulus presentations were programmed in Matlab
(MathWorks) using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Kleiner et al., 2007).
Stimuli were back-projected onto a translucent screen using a DLP pro-
jector (Panasonic PT-D7700E) located outside themagnetically shielded
room. The projected areawas 17× 13.6° visual angles (with a resolution
of 1280 × 1024 pixels) and the refresh rate was 60 Hz. A photodiode
was placed at the upper left corner of the projection screen in order to
record the exact onset of the visual stimulation.
Fig. 1. Trial structure of the experimental paradigm. Each trial started with a ﬁxation cross for a jittered period of 3 to 6 s. The stimulation sequence consisted of the consecutive
presentation of a forward mask (67 ms), followed by a four-letter stimulus (33 ms) and by a backward mask (67 ms). The color of the masks was adjusted individually with a
staircase procedure prior to the experiment. The letters constituted either a word or a pseudoword, and were presented in gray (trials at threshold), in white (catch trials, increased
visibility), or in black (empty trials, invisible). After an interval of 500 ms, participants were required ﬁrst to report if they had perceived any letters (detection task) and second to
classify the stimulus as word or pseudoword (lexical decision, or classiﬁcation task).
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Whole-head recordings were performed using a 306-channel (102
triplets composed of one magnetometer and two planar gradiometers)
MEG system (Neuromag306; Elekta) in a magnetically shielded room.
The sampling rate was 1000 Hz and hardware ﬁlters were used to
band-pass the measured signal between 0.1 and 330 Hz. Prior to the
MEG recording, the location of ﬁve head-position indicators (HPI
coils) and a minimum of 200 head-shape samples were digitized
(3Space Fastrack; Polhemus) relative to three anatomical landmarks
on the participant's head (nasion and left and right pre-auricular
points). The head position inside the MEG helmet was localized at the
beginning of each experimental block for co-registration purposes.Behavioral data analysis
Signal detection theory was used to test participants' ability to dis-
criminate a stimulus presented at threshold from background noise
(empty trials). For this purpose, we deﬁned perceived threshold trials
as ‘hits’, not perceived threshold trials as ‘misses’, perceived empty trials
as ‘false alarms’, and not perceived empty trials as ‘correct rejections’.
The d′ sensitivity measure was calculated for each participant, and the
group performance was tested with a one-sample t-test against a sam-
plemeanof 0 (representing chance-level performance). To testwhether
trials at threshold were more likely to be reported as perceived or not
perceived, detection rates were analyzed with a one-sample t-test
against a sample mean of 0.5.
For the analysis of the classiﬁcation task, ﬁrstly, we obtained a mea-
sure of classiﬁcation bias. This indexed participants' likelihood to make
either one of the classiﬁcation responses (word or pseudoword), irre-
spective of classiﬁcation accuracy. Secondly, we sorted trials according
to stimulus class (word or pseudoword), and tested participants' ability
to classify words and pseudowords as such. The ratio of correct classiﬁ-
cations was calculated separately for each of the four possible combina-
tions of stimulus class and stimulus intensity, i.e. threshold words,
threshold pseudowords, catch words, and catch pseudowords (not for
empty trials, as stimuli presented in this condition were completely in-
visible). Finally, we sorted trials according to stimulus detection(perceived and not perceived), and tested whether participants' ability
to perform the classiﬁcation task varied depending on whether the
stimulus was perceived or not. The ratio of correct classiﬁcations was
calculated separately for each of the four possible combinations of stim-
ulus detection and stimulus intensity, i.e. threshold perceived, threshold
not perceived, catch perceived, and catch not perceived. Statistical anal-
yses were performed by means of one-sample t-tests against a sample
mean of 0.5.
Response times to the ﬁrst and second questions in trials at
threshold were calculated separately for each of the four possible com-
binations of stimulus class (word and pseudoword) and stimulus detec-
tion (perceived and not perceived). Statistical analysis was performed
using a two-way repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with factors ‘task’ (2 levels: detection and classiﬁcation) and ‘stimulus’
(4 levels: perceived word, not perceived word, perceived pseudoword,
and not perceived pseudoword).
MEG data analysis
The analysis was performed using Matlab, the FieldTrip toolbox
(Oostenveld et al., 2011) and SPM8 (Litvak et al., 2011). The MEG data
were epoched (±3 s locked to target stimulus onset), high-pass ﬁltered
at 1 Hz using a two-pass, 6th order Butterworth ﬁlter, and down-
sampled to 250 Hz. Epochs were concatenated across blocks and
inspected for artifacts using a semi-automatic procedure. Trials that
contained eye blinks or muscle activity and sensors that were consis-
tently contaminated by artifacts (e.g. channel jumps) were identiﬁed
and removed from the dataset. The rejected channels were interpolated
using the nearest-neighbor approach and used for analysis of sensor-
level, but not source-level, data.
Event-related ﬁelds analysis
Prior to event-related ﬁelds (ERFs) calculation, data were band-pass
ﬁltered between 2 and 20 Hz using a two-pass, 4th order Butterworth
ﬁlter. Trials were baseline corrected by subtracting the mean activity
in a −0.3 to −0.1 s time-interval preceding target stimulus onset
from thewhole individual trial, and then averaged. For planar gradiom-
eters, the combined amplitude was computed at each orthogonal
gradient pair according to Pythagora's theorem.
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Frequency-domain analysis was performed for each trial separately.
Spectral estimates were computed using fast Fourier transform (FFT)
with a single Hanning taper, for time windows of 500 ms (from−1 to
1 s in steps of 50 ms) and frequencies between 4 and 34 Hz (in steps
of 2 Hz). Power values were calculated separately for the vertical and
horizontal component of the planar gradients, and combined via their
sum. The resultant frequency solutions were averaged across trials,
resulting in total power.
Statistical analysis
Statistical analyses of ERFs and time–frequency representations at
sensor level were performed using a non-parametric cluster-based per-
mutation test. By increasing the sensitivity of the statistical test, while
controlling for the multiple comparison problem, this approach is par-
ticularly advantageous for statistical MEG data analysis (Maris and
Oostenveld, 2007). Firstly, clusters of statistically signiﬁcant differences
(paired-sample t-tests between conditions, exceeding the threshold of
p b 0.05) that were adjacent in space, time, and frequency were identi-
ﬁed. Secondly, the t statistics within each cluster were summed up, and
a cluster-level maximum statistic was obtained by selecting the cluster
with largest sum statistic (both for positive and negative clusters).
Thirdly, 10,000 random permutations of the data (data exchanged be-
tween conditions within the participants) were generated using the
Monte Carlomethod, and a reference distribution ofmaximum statistics
was produced under the null hypothesis that the datawere not different
between conditions. Finally, the p-value of the cluster-level statistic ob-
served on the data was estimated from the proportion of values in the
reference distribution exceeding the observed maximum statistic (and
then Bonferroni-corrected for the probability of observing both positive
and negative signiﬁcant clusters).
Source analysis
To identify the probable generators of the time–frequency effect
observed at sensor level (see Induced responses below), source localiza-
tion was performed using a frequency-domain beamforming algorithm
(dynamic imaging of coherent sources, DICS; Gross et al., 2001). For this
purpose, the canonical cortical anatomy of each participant was gener-
ated via afﬁne transformation of a Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) template onto the subject's digitized head shape. The pseudo-
individual MRI was then divided into a grid of equidistant points
(1 cm resolution) and a single-shell head model (Nolte, 2003) was
used to compute the leadﬁeld at each grid location. The cross-spectral
density matrix was estimated using multitaper FFT with Slepian tapers,
within the time–frequencywindow of the effect revealed by the sensor-
level analysis (12 ± 3 Hz, 0.5–1 s, see also Induced responses below). A
common spatial ﬁlter was computed for each grid location using data
epochs from all trial conditions. Source power was then estimated in
each condition by applying the beamformer ﬁlter to each condition
separately.
Source-level connectivity analysis
Using an exploratorywhole brain approachwe investigated connec-
tivity patterns based on seeds determined by the source-level power
effect. To do this we computed source-level Fourier coefﬁcients by
ﬁrst estimating the cross-spectral density in a time–frequency window
centered on the sensor-level effects (12 ± 4 Hz, 0.5–1 s). Secondly, we
computed beamformer ﬁlters (Gross et al., 2001) from the combined
data sets (perceived and not perceived) using the leadﬁelds for the
equidistant grid as described above. These ﬁlters were then applied to
sensor-level Fourier coefﬁcients, which were estimated using
multitaper FFT with Slepian tapers (12 ± 4 Hz, 0.5–1 s). Finally, the
source-level Fourier coefﬁcients served to estimate the cross-spectral
density on source level, fromwhichwe calculated coherence, ameasure
of phase synchrony between grid point derived from the complex part
of the cross-spectrum (Nolte et al., 2004). We evaluated differences incoherence between perceived and not perceived stimuli by contrasting
the values for the two grid pointswith themaximumpower effect in the
parietal [MNI coordinates: −32 −54 41 mm] and temporal cortex
[−62−57 11 mm] with paired-sample t-tests, thresholded for p b 0.01.
Results
Behavioral results
The analysis of the detection task indicated that our experimental
manipulation of letter-visibility was successful. The rate of stimuli re-
ported as perceived was 0.5 for trials at threshold (95% CI [0.43, 0.57]),
0.9 for catch trials (95% CI [0.85, 0.94]), and 0.2 for empty trials (95%
CI [0.12, 0.33]), with similar detection rates for word and pseudoword
stimuli (Fig. 2a). The signal detection theory analysis conﬁrmed that
participantsweremore likely to perceive stimuli presented at threshold,
compared to incorrectly reporting empty trials as perceived (d′= 0.95,
t(19) = 7.3, p b 0.001). The probability of reporting threshold trials as
perceived or not perceived was at chance level (t(19) = 0.1, p= 0.9).
The analysis of classiﬁcation bias (Fig. 2b) revealed that, irrespective
of whether stimuli were perceived or not, participants weremore likely
to respond ‘pseudoword’ in the classiﬁcation task when stimuli were
presented at threshold (perceived, t(19) = −4.5, p b 0.001; not per-
ceived, t(19) = −3.6, p = 0.002), or in empty trials (perceived,
t(19) =−4.2, p b 0.001; not perceived, t(19) =−3.8, p = 0.001), but
not in catch trials (perceived, t(19) = 0.4, p = 0.7; not perceived,
t(19) = −1.7, p = 0.1). This caused the accuracy rates of words and
pseudowords at threshold (Fig. 2c) to be signiﬁcantly different from
chance level (words, t(19) = −3.5, p = 0.002; pseudowords, t(19) =
5.4, p b 0.001), a spurious result of the classiﬁcation bias. The classiﬁca-
tion accuracy of catch trials (Fig. 2c), which were not affected by any
bias in classiﬁcation, was signiﬁcantly better than chance both when
the stimulus was a word (t(19) = 5.2, p b 0.001), and when it was a
pseudoword (t(19) = 2.6, p= 0.02). This indicates that, irrespective of
whether they were perceived or not, words and pseudowords were
classiﬁed with better than chance accuracy when they were presented
with supra-threshold intensity.
Participants' ability to correctly discriminate between words and
pseudowords, i.e. classiﬁcation accuracy, is shown in Fig. 2d as a func-
tion of stimulus detection (separately for perceived and not perceived
stimuli). When stimuli were presented at threshold, classiﬁcation accu-
racywas not signiﬁcantly better than chance level. Although the rates of
correct classiﬁcation approached statistical signiﬁcance (perceived,
t(19) = 2.0, p= 0.058; not perceived, t(19) = 1.4, p= 0.17), the size of
the effect was small (perceived, 95% CI [0.49 0.58]; not perceived, 95%
CI [0.49 0.54]). When stimuli were presented supra-threshold, i.e. in
catch trials, classiﬁcation accuracy was signiﬁcantly better than chance
when the stimulus was perceived (t(19) = 4.8, p b 0.001), but not
when the stimulus was not perceived (t(19) = 0.9, p = 0.4). This indi-
cates that stimuli, irrespective of being words or pseudowords, were
classiﬁed with better than chance accuracy only if they were presented
with supra-threshold intensity and perceived.
The results of ANOVA on response times showed no effect of task
(F(1,19) = 2.6, p=0.1) or stimulus (F(3,57) = 0.3, p=0.8) and no inter-
action effect (F(3,57) = 1.7, p = 0.2). Therefore, in trials at threshold,
there were no differences in participants' detection and classiﬁcation
response times, irrespective of stimuli being words, pseudowords,
perceived, or not perceived.
MEG results
Evoked responses
Non-parametric cluster-based statistical testing of ERFs did not
reveal a signiﬁcant difference between perceived and not perceived
stimuli at threshold. Using a time window of−0.3 to 0.5 s relative to
target stimulus onset, clusters of statistically signiﬁcant differences
Fig. 2. Behavioral results. a) Detection rate, i.e. rate of threshold, catch, and empty trials that were reported as perceived in the detection task, plotted separately for words and
pseudowords. b) Classiﬁcation bias, i.e. rate of threshold, catch, and empty trials that were classiﬁed as words, irrespective of classiﬁcation accuracy, plotted separately for perceived
and not perceived stimuli. c) Classiﬁcation accuracy of words and pseudowords, irrespective of stimuli being perceived or not. Note that statistical signiﬁcance in trials at threshold is a
spurious result of the classiﬁcation bias shown in b), see also Behavioral results. d) Classiﬁcation accuracy of perceived and not perceived stimuli, irrespective of stimuli being words or
pseudowords. Results of statistical analyses are shown in panels b), c), and d), with stars indicating signiﬁcant results (p b 0.05) of one-sample t-tests against a sample mean of 0.5.
Error bars represent standard error of the mean. Words are represented in light gray, pseudowords in dark gray, perceived stimuli in white, and not perceived stimuli in black.
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ters and combined planar gradiometers). This indicates that stimuli pre-
sented at threshold did not result in evoked responses of different
amplitude depending on whether they were perceived or not.
Induced responses
Statistical testing of sensor-level time–frequency representations for
perceived and not perceived stimuli at threshold was performed over
the entire frequency range, in two distinct timewindows. In a timewin-
dow of−1 to 0 s, the observed clusters were not signiﬁcant (p N 0.05).
In a timewindow of 0 to 1 s, the analysis revealed one signiﬁcant cluster
(p = 0.0005), indicating a statistically signiﬁcant difference between
the two conditions in this time window. Therefore, while no difference
in power was observed for ongoing pre-stimulus oscillations, stimuli at
threshold resulted in induced responses of different power depending
on whether they were perceived or not perceived.
To focus our later source analysis appropriately, we identiﬁed the
time and frequency windows representing the strongest sensor-level
effect. For this purpose, we selected a subset of sensors corresponding
to the topographically most robust effect (see highlighted sensors in
Fig. 3a). The selection was performed by repeating the cluster-based
permutation with more conservative criteria (α= 0.01 for both ﬁrst
and second order statistics). This left 37 of the initial 72 sensors that
formed the cluster observed with α= 0.05. This subset of sensors was
averaged, producing a time–frequency representation of averaged t
values. As illustrated in Fig. 3b, perceived stimuli were characterized
by signiﬁcantly lower power in the post-stimulus period, compared to
not perceived stimuli at threshold. The cluster (α= 0.05) was com-
prised of a relatively broad range of frequencies (from 4 to 24 Hz),
with the greatest difference centered in the alpha range (at ~12 Hz;
Fig. 3c). The cluster emerged at ~0.4 s and, in time, the greatest differ-
ence was observed at ~0.8 s (Fig. 3d). In summary, perceived stimuli
at threshold induced a stronger decrease in alpha power, compared to
not perceived stimuli at threshold. This response was sustained until
at least 1 s after the onset of the stimulus, and spread over left-lateralized scalp locations, including mainly central, parietal, and tem-
poral sensors.
Source localization
Using a beamformer analysis (see Source analysis above), we
estimated the probable generators of the sensor-level effect between
0.5 and 1 s, for frequencies between 9 and 15 Hz (Fig. 3b). Source-
power estimates for the two conditions were compared statistically by
means of t-tests (p b 0.01, uncorrected). Results revealed a signiﬁcantly
stronger decrease in alpha power over parietal and temporal regions of
the left hemisphere for perceived, compared to not perceived stimuli at
threshold (Fig. 3e). The peak of activity was localized to the angular
gyrus (Brodmann area [BA] 39) in the left inferior parietal lobule, and
extended mainly anteriorly to the supramarginal gyrus (BA40), but
also to perisylvian and superior temporal cortices (e.g. BA22), and to
the middle temporal gyrus (BA21).
Source-level connectivity effects
Contrasts of coherence between perceived and not perceived stimuli
are shown in Fig. 4. The seed in the left temporal cortex (Fig. 4a, [−62
−57 11mm]) showed stronger connections to the inferior frontal cortex
and to an area covering themiddle to superior temporal gyrus (BA21, 22).
For the seed in left parietal cortex (Fig. 4b, [−32 54 11 mm]) we found
increased coherence for perceived compared to not perceived stimuli in
a scattered pattern of contralateral temporal, parietal, and frontal areas.
Discussion
In the present study, we investigated the partial awareness hypoth-
esis (Kouider et al., 2010), which states distinct features of a stimulus
can be consciously represented independently of each other. To test
this hypothesis we used visually presented words and pseudowords.
These stimuli can be broken into a number of distinct features, provid-
ing an ideal scenario for conscious perception to arise at partial levels
of representation. Importantly, each of these representational levels
Fig. 3. Sensor-level contrast of perceived versus not perceived stimuli at threshold. a) Scalp-level topographyhighlighting the cluster of sensors (p b 0.01) selected for sensor-level analysis.
The overlaid topographicalmap illustrates the statistical contrast perceived versus not perceived (t valuesmasked at p b 0.05; corrected formultiple comparisons) averaged over time (0.5
to 1 s) and frequency (8 to 16 Hz). Blue colors index lower power for perceived stimuli. b) Time–frequency representation of t values (masked at p b 0.05; corrected for multiple
comparisons) averaged over the cluster of sensors shown in a). The solid black line marks the time–frequency window selected for source analysis. Color scale as in a). c) T values
averaged over time (0.5 to 1 s), separately for each frequency bin. The horizontal gray bar illustrates the size of the cluster in frequency (p b 0.05). The shaded area in light-blue
represents standard deviation across the cluster of sensors. d) T values averaged over frequency (8 to 16 Hz), separately for each time point. The horizontal gray bar illustrates the size
of the cluster in time (p b 0.05). Shaded area as in c). e) The color-map illustrates the statistical contrast perceived versus not perceived (t values masked at p b 0.01; uncorrected) of
source-reconstructed power in a time–frequency window of 0.5–1 s and 10 ± 3 Hz, overlaid on a standard MNI brain. Blue colors indicate greater decrease in alpha power for
perceived compared to not perceived stimuli.
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cluding visual feature analysis, orthographic processing of letters and
letter strings, grapheme-to-phoneme conversion, lexical access and se-
mantic knowledge retrieval (see Carreiras et al., 2014 for a comparison
of modular and interactive accounts of these processes). Here, we
disentangled a pre-lexical stage of visual word recognition consisting
of the orthographic representation of single alphabetic letters, the build-
ing blocks of words. By isolating this representational level, we identi-
ﬁed a clear condition of partial awareness in which the properties of
the stimulus begin to emerge but are not yet fully represented within
consciousness.
This was achieved with a visual word masking paradigm, in which
the masks were adjusted individually and resulted in perception of let-
ters in approximately half of the trials. The low-level properties of
words and pseudowordswere carefully controlled for, and performance
in a lexical decision task was monitored to ensure that perception did
not escalate to full stimulus awareness. Thus, by virtue of our
experimental manipulation, participants could only perceive individual
letters, while remaining unaware of the whole letter strings presented.
Crucially, the mask intensity was identical across trials, thereby
preventing changes in perceptual awareness resulting from differencesin stimulation. We hypothesized that perceiving letters consciously
would depend on cortical activity in essential nodes that support pre-
lexical orthographic processing in visual word recognition. We found
that the transition from absence of awareness to partial awareness of
words was marked by suppression of oscillatory alpha power in
temporal and parietal regions of the left hemisphere. We suggest that
this result reﬂects the engagement of cortical areas that are responsible
for establishing andmaintaining conscious representations of individual
pre-lexical units.
The neuronal bases of visual word recognition (in this context also
simply referred to as ‘reading’) lie in a network of cortical regions
lateralized to the dominant, typically left, hemisphere. According to
the classic dual-route account (Coltheart et al., 1993; see Price, 2012;
Pugh et al., 2000a for reviews, and Jobard et al., 2003 for a meta-
analysis), this network consists of two separate processing streams, a
dorsal pathway (including the left supramarginal and angular gyri, as
well as the superior temporal gyrus), and a ventral pathway (compris-
ingmainly left inferior occipito-temporal regions). In visualword recog-
nition paradigms, both pathways have been imaged with MEG using
source-reconstruction of 10–20 Hz oscillatory activity (Cornelissen
et al., 2009; Pammer et al., 2004, 2006). Consistent with these studies,
Fig. 4. Seeded connectivity analysis. Contrasts of coherence of perceived and not perceived stimuli. The seeds (green circles) were chosen based on the power effect (see Fig. 3e).
a) Coherence based on a temporal seed [−62−57 11 mm] and b) based on a parietal seed [MNI coordinates:−32−54 41 mm]. The t values are masked at p b 0.01 (uncorrected).
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peaked in the alpha range (~12Hz) and spanned beta-band frequencies
up to approximately 24 Hz. The alpha suppressionwas particularly pro-
nounced in the left angular and supramarginal gyri. These regions over-
lap with only part of the more extended network involved in reading
whole words, indicating that conscious representations at the level of
single letters were supported mainly by the dorsal pathway. To explore
the different contribution of temporal and parietal regions within this
pathway,we performed a seeded functional connectivity analysis. Inter-
estingly, while the left parietal seed showed scattered connections dis-
tributed over the right hemisphere, the connectivity pattern of the left
temporal seed was more consistent, with strong connections between
left temporal and left frontal regions of the dorsal network.
The observation that only a subset of essential nodes appeared to be
speciﬁcally activated under conditions of partial awareness suggests
that our design was effective in conﬁning visual word recognition to
the mere process of letter identiﬁcation. Recently, it has been proposed
that the manner in which orthographic processing interacts with pho-
nological and semantic information can be shaped differently in differ-
ent languages (Frost, 2012). Speciﬁcally, Italian orthography is
consistent, i.e. based on simple grapho-phonological conversion rules,
whereas English orthography is inconsistent and requires complex
rules for mapping letters to sounds. Therefore, Italian graphemes can
be unequivocally converted into the corresponding phonemes, and
this could explain the greater engagement of dorsal regions in Italian
readers, as opposed to the ventral pathway in English readers
(Paulesu et al., 2000). Our study did not require participants to access
speciﬁc mapping rules stored in ventral regions (Szwed et al., 2012).
Therefore, the recruitment of the dorsal pathwaymay reﬂect the depen-
dence of visual orthographic information on grapho-phonological con-
version, which would allow the visual representation to become
conscious despite strong visual masking.
One aspect of our results that appears important to consider is the
timing of the alpha effect. According to the GNW model (see Dehaene
and Changeux, 2011 for a review), conscious representations would
be triggered as late as 300ms after presentation of a stimulus, as neuro-
nal activity reverberates among high-level cortical areas (Del Cul et al.,
2007). This could explain, at least in part, why no difference was ob-
served between the evoked responses to perceived and not perceived
letters, within theﬁrst 500ms after stimulus onset. Rather, the temporalevolution of alpha power observed here is in linewith the idea of recur-
rent neuronal activity outlasting input termination (Fisch et al., 2009;
see Lamme, 2006; Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000 for reviews). Thus, the
alpha suppression could reﬂect local recurrent processing along the
dorsal route, either by enhancement of cortical excitability (Klimesch
et al., 2007) or by disengagement from functional inhibition (Jensen
and Mazaheri, 2010). The GNW further predicts the neuronal signal to
reverberate globally across not only temporal and parietal cortices, but
also frontal association cortices. In support of this, our connectivity anal-
ysis results showed higher connectivity between left temporal and left
inferior frontal regions. Although speculative, the orthographic
information could be successfully represented into consciousness by
accessing the corresponding phonological information stored in the
supramarginal gyrus (Stoeckel et al., 2009) and superior temporal corti-
ces (Joseph et al., 2001). In this view, forming and retaining an object
into awareness, an alphabetic letter in this case, would engage a
network of nodes in which the different features of such an object are
represented (see Ghazanfar and Schroeder, 2006; Spence and Bayne,
2014 formultisensory accounts resembling this perspective). These fea-
tures would then be incorporated into a unique conscious representa-
tion, a process that in our study appeared to be mediated by the
angular gyrus, an ideal candidate for high-level multimodal integration
(Binder et al., 2009; Pugh et al., 2000b; Seghier, 2013).
Thework presented here represents one of the very few studies pro-
viding evidence of the electrophysiological correlates of partial aware-
ness (as deﬁned in Kouider et al., 2010). In the context of partial
awareness, one MEG study contrasted words perceived incompletely
with words perceived fully (Levy et al., 2013). The authors claimed
that the transition from partial to complete visual word recognition
was marked by suppression of alpha activity in regions of the ventral
pathway. However, the contrast between full and partial awareness
does not reﬂect the emergence of partial awareness per se. Rather, a
state of no awareness needs to be contrasted in order to isolate partial
awareness, as we did in this study. More recently, Levy et al. (2015) re-
ported early and late gamma-band (N40Hz) responses to be involved in
partial and full awareness of words, respectively. Because their experi-
mental design (e.g., task methodology and language) differed from
our study, results are difﬁcult to compare. One of the discrepancies,
however, immediately rekindles an ongoing debate on visual word rec-
ognition. The study by Levy et al. (2015) implicated a portion of the left
286 L. Magazzini et al. / NeuroImage 133 (2016) 279–287fusiformgyrus that has been proposed by some authors as a functionally
specialized ‘visual word form area’ (VWFA; Cohen et al., 2000, 2002).
The putative role of the VWFA would consist of establishing abstract
representations of letter strings, although the claim of functional speci-
ﬁcity in this region has been strongly criticized by other researchers
(Price and Devlin, 2003). If inferior temporal regions were involved in
orthographic processing (a view that appears to be generally accepted,
cf. Dehaene and Cohen, 2011; Price and Devlin, 2011), it appears from
our study that they were not crucial to form conscious representations
of single letters. Evidence from neuropsychological cases is consistent
with our results, and suggests that lesions to the VWFA do not
completely disrupt the ability to read (Cohen et al., 2003, 2004). Thus,
the VWFA could rather represent a feed-forward processing region
(reviewed in Carreiras et al., 2014; see also Levy et al., 2015), projecting
to higher-order cortical areas where the orthographic representation
would be brought into awareness.
Finally, our conclusions should be discussed in light of recent
reviews on the rationale behind the NCC research (Aru et al., 2012; de
Graaf et al., 2012). Speciﬁcally, a distinction between different correlates
of awareness has been proposed, with some of the NCC constituting
either prerequisites or consequences of consciousness, rather than actu-
al substrates of the conscious experience itself. The NCC prerequisites
(reviewed in Ruhnau et al., 2014) can be considered to reﬂect the neu-
ronal ‘state’ that precedes stimulus onset, andhave been often identiﬁed
in either the power (e.g., Hanslmayr et al., 2007) or the phase
(e.g., Busch et al., 2009) of pre-stimulus oscillations. Although phase
measures were not taken into account here, we found no differences
in pre-stimulus oscillatory power between perceived and not perceived
stimuli. However, this is not surprising if we assume that the use of
forward masks could reset the cortical state of the visual system imme-
diately before the presentation of each target stimulus (likewise, differ-
ences in the evoked response to perceived and not perceived letters
could be obscured by the strong visual evoked responses to forward
and backwardmasks). The NCC consequences, instead, consist of the re-
sult of conscious experience, and aremuchmore difﬁcult to disentangle
from the NCC substrates (de Graaf et al., 2012). The latency of the alpha
effect observed here is consistentwith an interpretation in terms of NCC
consequences, although it does not rule out predictions made by both
GNW and recurrent processing theories of conscious perception
(Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Lamme, 2006). Nevertheless, due to
the correlational nature of our methods, the role of the angular and
supramarginal gyri in supporting partial awareness of words remains
to be further investigated. For example, studies adopting
neuromodulatory techniques, such as TMS (see de Graaf and Sack,
2014; Ro, 2010; Tapia and Beck, 2014 for reviews), could prove
extremely useful in establishing the causal relationship between neuro-
nal activity in regions of the dorsal pathway and conscious perception of
individual orthographic units.
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